How FREE Is HARASSMENT FREE? EMPLOYER
LIABILITY FOR THIRD-PARTY RACIAL
HARASSMENT

Robert E. Wonet
Freda and Sonia, both African-Americans, are waitresses at a local
hotel. A local civic group has booked the ballroom and invited a noted
comedian as the entertainment for the evening. The group has informed the
hotel management that the comedian will be performing. The hotel
manager is aware, from personal experience at another banquet, that the
comedian uses racially and sexually explicit jokes in his routine.
Both waitresses are sent in to clear dishes while the comedian is
performing. They hear him make jokes about the sexual organs and sexual
abilities of black men and women, using terms such as: "wog," "nigger,"
and "sambo." Upon spotting the waitresses, the comedian, addressing them
from the stage, makes racial jokes about their appearances and sexual
abilities.
The waitresses, although upset, continue their work. Later in the
evening, while serving coffee, one waitress is asked by an audience
member, "What is it like to do it with a black woman?" The other waitress
is also the target of racial remarks from an audience member.1 The next
morning, both waitresses file a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission under Title VII, charging sexual and racial
harassment.
What is the proper role of the employer in combating racism in the
workplace? Is it sufficient to hold the employer responsible for the racial
harassment only of those under the employer's direct control-supervisors
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1. Facts from this hypothetical are loosely modeled after plaintiffs' experiences at an
English hotel. See Burton v. De Vere Hotels, 1997 I.C.R. 1 (Employment Appeals Trib.
1996) (holding employer liable for third-party racial harassment).
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and coworkers?2 Alternatively, may society impose liability on employers
for exposing employees to racial harassment from third parties, such as
customers and clients? A well-developed body of law addresses the
former, but little addresses the latter. Clarity and consistency in the law
would render imposing liability on employers advantageous in both
contexts.
The United States District Court of Minnesota confronted the dearth
of precedent in third-party liability cases in Rosenbloom v. Senior
Resource, Inc.3 In Rosenbloom, clients and a member of the general public
racially harassed a social services agency employee at a senior center
operated by the agency.4 The cited harassment included name-calling,
using slurs such as "nigger," "sambo," and "zebra," as well as physical
assaults and threats.5 Concluding that this case presented a question of first
impression regarding employer liability under Title VII for third-party
racial harassment, 6 the court sought guidance from the developing body of
case law regarding employer liability for third-party sexual harassment.
The Rosenbloom court's deference to the sexual harassment case law
is not surprising. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 strikes at
discrimination against protected categories such as race and sex, stating
that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin .... 8 Nothing in the statute's
language suggests that differing definitions of "discrimination" should be
applied in racial and sexual harassment cases.
Harassment claims under Title VI9 historically have been analyzed in

2. Title VII's content-based focus disturbs some courts and critics because they
perceive it as government regulation of free speech. While these points are interesting, this
Comment will presume the validity of the existing framework. See generally Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech vs. Workplace Harassment Law (visited Nov. 20, 1998)
<http:lwww.law.ucla.edulFaculty/volokhlharass/>.
3. 974 F. Supp. 738 (D. Minn. 1997).
4. See id. at 740-41.
5. See id.
6. Third-party harassment is not to be confused with third-party claims based on
sexual or racial harassment of coworkers, colleagues, etc. See, e.g., Crockwell v.
Blackmon-Mooring Steamatic, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 800, 808 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) (concluding
that a female employee was discharged for opposing the sexual harassment of a coworker).
7. See Rosenbloom, 974 F. Supp. at 744 (looking to sexual harassment case law for
guidance on third-party racial harassment).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
9. Of course, other legal means may exist for combating harassing behavior. See, e.g.,
Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassmentand the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106
HARv. L. REV. 517 (1993) (advocating the use of general harassment statutes, fighting
words statutes, and tort law to control street harassment).
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two categories:10 quid pro quo claims" and hostile work environment
claims.1 2 The Supreme Court recognized the legitimacy of hostile work
environment claims in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson."

The Meritor

Court relied extensively on an earlier Fifth Circuit decision, Rogers v.
EEOC,14 finding Title VII liability for a racially hostile work
environment.15 Accordingly, it is only fitting that we look to the evolution
of sexual 1harassment
case law for guidance on third-party racial
6
harassment.

This Comment examines the Rosenbloom scenario and the
implications of imposing liability on employers for the racially harassing
acts of third parties. This Comment seeks to navigate between the need to
combat racial harassment, the desire for consistent hostile work
environment standards in both the sexual and racial contexts, the hope for
workplaces where women and minorities have equal opportunities to work
free from harassment, and the belief that assessing liability under Title VII
for the action of third parties unfairly burdens the employer with the task of
combating society's ills. Part I will review the development of hostile
work environment theory generally, the development of third-party sexual
10. Courts may consider some third-party harassment to be a form of quid pro quo
harassment. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (illustrating the treatment of
sexually revealing employer dress codes as quid pro quo harassment). This Comment
reflects a belief that third-party harassment is best viewed as establishing a hostile work
environment.
11. Quid pro quo harassment occurs when "an employer demand[s] sexual favors from
an employee in return for a job benefit .. " Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct.
2257,2264(1998).
12. Hostile work environment harassment exists "[w]hen the workplace is permeated
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment... ." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
13. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Justice William Rehnquist wrote: "[plaintiff] argues... that
unwelcome sexual advances that create an offensive or hostile working environment violate
Title VII." Id. at 64. "[W]e hold that a claim of 'hostile work environment' sex
discrimination is actionable under Title VII .... " Id. at 73.
14. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
15. See 477 U.S. at 65-66.
16. This Comment analogizes racial and sexual harassment as part of a reasoned system
for combating workplace discrimination. Professor Hebert fears that analogizing racial
harassment to sexual harassment makes it more difficult for employees to establish racially
hostile work environment claims. See L. Camille Hebert, Analogizing Race and Sex in
Workplace Harassment Claims, 58 OImO ST. L.J. 819 (1997). Specifically, she does not
believe that the "stringent burdens" of sexual harassment cases would have been imposed in
any other Title VII context. See id. at 824. Such concerns undervalue the language found in
Title VII which underlies all hostile work environment claims. The statute does not
differentiate between the two contexts and no reasonable rationale justifies why work
environments-objectively and subjectively hostile in the racial or sexual contexts-should
not be analyzed similarly.
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harassment theory specifically, and the relationship between the sexual
harassment and the racial harassment contexts under Title VII. In Part II,
this Comment will advocate the adoption of the sexual harassment thirdparty harassment theory set forth in Rosenbloom and explore its
implications for the employer. Finally, this Comment will suggest how a
conscientious employer may seek to respond adequately to this developing
area of Title VII liability.
I.

TITLE VII: DEFINING HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT LIABILITY OF
THE EMPLOYER

Described as the "most broadly based and influential federal statute
prohibiting discrimination in employment,"1 7 Title VII, as proposed
originally, did not apply to sex-based discrimination. 1
Adding a
prohibition against sex discrimination to the bill as a last minute effort to
defeat the measure, opponents of the Civil Rights Act argued that sex
discrimination was sufficiently different to warrant separate treatment.1 9
The opponents failed and Title VII
was passed, including prohibitions
20
sex.
on
based
discrimination
against
Two historic cases have dominated the hostile work environment
analysis, starting with the Fifth Circuit's 1971 recognition of hostile work
environment claims in Rogers,2' and concluding with the Supreme Court's
1986 imprimatur in Meritor.22
In Rogers, the plaintiff maintained that her employer's practice of
allowing her to work only with patients of a certain race constituted an
unlawful employment practice. 23 Finding congressional intent for a liberal
interpretation of Title VII, 24 the Fifth Circuit rejected the lower court's
dismissal of the hostile work environment claim, stating:
[Ihe relationship between

an employee

and his working

17. HAROLD S.Lmwis, JR., CIvIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMINATION LAW § 3.1,
at 148 (1997).
18. See 110 CONG. REc. 2720-21 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Green).
19. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
21. 454 F.2d 234, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1971) (permitting a Hispanic complainant to prove a
Title VII violation by demonstrating that her employer had created a hostile work
environment).
22. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that "a claim of 'hostile environment' sex
discrimination is actionable under Title VII ....
23. See 454 F.2d at 237-38.
24. "Congress chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor to
elucidate in extenso the parameter of such nefarious activities. Rather, it pursued the path of
wisdom ....Title VII... should be accorded a liberal interpretation in order.., to
eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of ethnic discrimination." Id.at
238.

1999]

THRD-PARTY RACIAL HARASSMENT

environment is of such significance as to be entitled to statutory

protection.

...
One can readily envision working environments so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the
emotional and psychological stability of minority group
workers... Section 703 of Title VII was aimed at the eradication
of such noxious practices.#

Courts since Rogers have demonstrated a robust willingness to use the
26
hostile work environment theory to combat workplace racial harassment.
However, courts resisted adopting the hostile work environment
theory in sexual harassment contexts. Hostile work environment claims
routinely failed in the 1970s. 27 The adoption of racial hostile work
environment theory to the sexual harassment context came first in 1981 in
Bundy v. Jackson,2 s followed by Henson v. City of Dundee29 in 1982. The
Eleventh Circuit noted in Henson that "[s]exual harassment which creates a
hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the
arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment
is to racial equality."30 The Supreme Court in Merito recognized the
25. Id. at 237-3 8.
26. See, e.g., Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1202 (8th Cir. 1981) (affirming a district
court's conclusion that racial slurs, discriminatory work assignments, and the hanging of a
noose constituted a racially hostile work environment); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d
169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (recognizing a pattern of racial slurs as creating a standing to sue
for a hostile work environment); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 553, 560 (N.D.
Ind. 1990) (finding that repeated instances of racially hostile graffiti and a dummy hung in
effigy constituted a racially hostile work environment); EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight
Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 386 (D. Minn. 1980) (finding that slashed tires, racially
derogatory graffiti, and racial comments constituted a hostile work environment).
27. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Ellen R. Peirce, Is Religious Harassment "More
Equal?", 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 44, 52-53 (1995); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment
As Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 333, 339-40
(1990); Rachel Mead Zweighaft, Comment, What's the Harm? The Legal Accommodation
of Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 18 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 434, 445-46 (1997).
These authors describe the initial judicial resistance to hostile work environment claims.
See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (denying a
Title VII claim where plaintiffs complained that the defendant's pursuit of romantic
relationships forced them to resign), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished table
decision).
28. 641 F.2d 934, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reversing a lower court's refusal to hold that
sexual harassment is a per se violation of Title VII).
29. 682 F.2d 897, 904 (lth Cir. 1982) (holding that Title VII sexual harassment
violations must be "sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and
create an abusive working environment").
30. Id. at 902.

31. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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extension.32
In Meritor, Justice Marshall concluded that a plaintiff might recover
by showing that "discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or
abusive work environment. 3 3 In the later case of Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.,34 the Supreme Court clarified the plaintiff's burden in sexual

harassment cases so as not to require a showing of psychological harm.
The Harris Court adopted a three-step test that explored the following
questions: (1) Would a reasonable person have found the environment
hostile or abusive? (2) Did the victim subjectively believe the environment
to be abusive?
and (3) Did this alter the conditions of the plaintiffs
35
employment?
The recognition of the hostile work environment doctrine created
many competing theories about the scope and extent of the employer's
liability. Given the broad role of employers in defining their workplace
environments, the frequent scenario of supervisor-originated harassment,
and the frequently brazen coworker harassment in early cases, theories of
liability for hostile environment analysis were primarily based on: (1)
notice 6 and (2) abuse of authority.37
In 1998, the Supreme Court furthered the evolution of harassment
analysis. In Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, s the Court heard the case of a
Boca Raton lifeguard who claimed she was sexually harassed by low-level
superiors within the lifeguard ranks.39 Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth,4° a companion case to Faragher,involved a sexually hostile work
environment claim based on unfulfilled threats by a supervisor to an
employee for sexual favors. The Court's decisions, while not disturbing

32. At that time, the Supreme Court did not explicitly comment on the viability of
hostile work environment claims for racial harassment. See infra notes 50-51 and
accompanying text (acknowledging that the Supreme Court had yet to address hostile work
environment for racial harassment).
33. 477 U.S. at 66.
34. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
35. See id. at 21-23; see also Dawn M. Buff, Note, Beyond the Court's Standard
Response: Creating an Effective Test for Determining Hostile Work Environment
HarassmentUnder Title VII, 24 STETSON L. REv. 719 (1995). Other observers characterize
the Harris decision as a two-step test. See LEwis, supra note 17, §3.1, at 188 (noting an
objective prong and a subjective prong from Harris).
36. See, e.g., Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1180 (2d Cir. 1996)
(observing that employer knowledge of a coworker's harassment gives rise to employer
liability).
37. See, e.g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
that employer liability for a supervisor's actions exists where the supervisor possessed the
authority to hire, fire, and otherwise alter conditions of employment).
38. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
39. See id. at 2280.
40. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
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theories of vicarious liability based on negligence, 41 drew attention instead
to the purpose of Title VII: the eradication of discrimination in the
workplace. The Court posited two additional questions for assessing
employer liability: (1) whether the employer exercised reasonable care to
avoid and remedy harassment; and (2) whether the employee acted with
reasonable care to use internal complaint procedures. 42 Fulfilling the
former constitutes an affirmative defense for employers, 43 as does the
failure of the employee to utilize the latter. 44
II.

JEALOUS COUSINS: EXAMINING THE TWIN-TRACKED DEVELOPMENT

OF RACIAL AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
"Title VII declares discriminatory practices based on race, gender,
religion, or national origin equally unlawful," wrote Justice Ginsburg in her
concurring opinion in Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc.45 But have the courts
adopted equally uniform standards?
The courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") maintain that they recognize a uniform standard of hostile work
environment for all of the Title VII categories, 46 but several commentators
question this characterization. Hostile work environment began with racial
harassment in Rogers47 in 1977 and migrated to sexual harassment four
years later in Bundy.48 The cross-pollination seen in the very beginnings of
harassment law suggests that, despite the rhetoric, the development is less
41. "An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should
have known about the conduct and failed to stop it. Negligence sets a minimum standard
for employer liability under Title VII .... " Id. at 2267.
42. See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2291.
43. See id. at 2292.
44. See id. In one of the early reported sexual harassment decisions following
Burlington Industries and Faragher,the Fourth Circuit examined a state employee's claim
of a racially hostile work environment caused by a supervisor. The Fourth Circuit
articulated the new nuances in Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 1998). There,
the court determined that employer vicarious liability results from a hostile work
environment when: (1) a supervisor takes a tangible employment action; (2) the employer
cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and cure the harassing behavior; or (3) the employer can show that the
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective
opportunities of the employer. See id. at 174-75.
45. 510 U.S. 17, 26 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
46. For example, the court observed no difference in Williams v. Perry, 907 F. Supp.
838 (M.D. Pa. 1995). "Although the claim in Harrisinvolved sexual harassment, the hostile
work environment theory applies equally to racial harassment." Id. at 846. "The EEOC
asserts that the same standard it uses to assess claims of environmental sexual
harassment... should also be used to decide harassment claims based on race, religion or
national origin." LEwis, supra note 17, § 3.1, at 185 n.47.
47. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
48. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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like a single track and, instead, more like parallel tracks, one for each
context.
Does a difference exist between the current racial hostile work
environment theory and its cousin in sexual harassment? If there is a
difference between the racial and sexual harassment contexts, is it
manifested in the wording of the standards or in the application of the
standards?
As far as the courts' explicit statements of the law are concerned, there
are no substantive differences between the sexual and racial harassment
standards. 49 The Supreme Court, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,50

linked the legal standards together, stating that "[w]hile this Court has not
yet had the opportunity to pass directly upon [racial harassment claims
under Title VII], the lower federal courts have uniformly upheld [them],
and we implicitly have approved [them] in... [our approval of sexual
harassment in] MeritorSavings Bank v. Vinson."51
In Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,'2 the Supreme Court compared
racial and sexual harassment and noted that "there is good sense in seeking
generally to harmonize the standards of what amounts to actionable
harassment." 3 In this footnote and the decision's examination of the
historical interplay between racial and sexual harassment, 4 the Supreme
Court seemingly invited further cross-fertilization between racial and

sexual harassment contexts. 55
Lower courts, in handling both types of claims, frequently interchange
precedents from both lines without any underlying analysis56 and permit the
aggregation of both claims to constitute a hostile work environment on the

totality of the circumstances.5 7
The EEOC guidelines, cited with approval in harassment cases,58 hint
49. See Harrison v. Metropolitan Gov't, 80 F.3d 1107, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he
elements and burden of proof that a Title VII plaintiff must meet are the same for racially
charged harassment as for sexually charged harassment.").
50. 491U.S. 164 (1989).
51. Id. at 180.
52. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
53. Id. at 2283 n.1.
54. See id. at 2282-83.
55. Indeed, the first sentence of the footnote approvingly noted that the circuit courts
"have properly drawn on standards developed in cases involving racial harassment" in
sexual harassment cases. Id. at 2283 n.1.
56. See, e.g., Coney v. Department of Human Resources, 787 F. Supp. 1434, 1443
(M.D. Ga. 1992) (using sexual harassment hostile work environment case law in a racial
harassment case).
57. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987)
(permitting the totality of racial and sexual harassment together to form a Title VII claim).
58. For general approval of the EEOC sexual harassment guidelines, look to Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986), and Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982). More generally, the Supreme Court stated in General Electric
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at the parallel contexts by the very existence of two guidelines and the
timing in the creation of the two guidelines. The guidelines
59 also illustrate
the significant cross-pollination between the two contexts.
A prime judicial example of the cross-pollination is Booker v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Systems. 60 In Booker, an African-American manager alleged
racial harassment by a supervisor. The court applied the first four prongs
of the old racially hostile work environment analysis, but then applied the
new "reasonable" factors enunciated by the Supreme Court in Faragher
and Burlington Industries in the sexual harassment context. The district
court first looked to determine whether the supervisor had taken "tangible
employment action," 61 which would lead to employer liability regardless of
Budget Rent-A-Car's notice.62 The district court then noted that even if
there was no tangible employment action, Budget Rent-A-Car still incurred
"reasonable care to correct and
vicarious liability for failing to exercise
63
prevent promptly" racial harassment.
An abortive attempt by the Sixth Circuit in 1988 to vary the
standards 64 was criticized by commentators 65 and rejected by the Sixth
Circuit two years later.66 The lower courts appear certain that either a
Co. v. Gilbert that EEOC rulings, interpretations, and opinions form a "body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." 429
U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
59. While there are EEOC guidelines for both national origin harassment, 29 C.F.R. §
1606.8 (1997), and sexual harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1997), note the first footnote in
the sexual harassment guidelines, which states that "[t]he principles involved here continue
to apply to race, color, religion or national origin." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 n.1 (1997).
60. 17 F. Supp. 2d 735 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
61. "The [Supreme] Court defined a tangible employment action as one which
'constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, [...] different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits."' Id. at 747 (quoting
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268 (1998)).
62. See id. at 746.

63. Id. at 747 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275,2293 (1998)).
64. The Sixth Circuit created a lesser standard of intermediate scrutiny for sexual
harassment, while using a higher standard of strict scrutiny for racial classifications. See
Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988). The Davis court reasoned that
the existence of two standards was not contrary to Title VII and consistent with civil rights
jurisprudence. See id. at 348 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Some circuits apply the same legal
standard for both types of hostile work environment claims, race and sex. We believe that
the standards need not necessarily be identical.... [T]he application of slightly different
standards in different types of hostile work environment claims is entirely consistent with
established civil rights jurisprudence.") (internal citations omitted). Id.
65. See Lisa Rhode, Case Note, The Sixth Circuit'sDouble Standard in Hostile Work
Environment Claims: Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir.1988), 58 U.

CN. L. Rnv. 779 (1989) (pointing out the dangers of varying standards, warning of
complications when presented with claims under other Title VII protected classes (religion,
national origin, etc.), and advocating a return by the Sixth Circuit to a single standard).
66. See Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 883 F.2d 475, 485 (6th
Cir. 1990) ("The decision in Davis... was a departure from the standard intended to be
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single body of harassment law exists that may be interchanged freely, or
the elusive harassment situation that would necessitate varying legal
standards between racial and sexual harassment has yet to be encountered. 67
However, even if the same standards are purportedly adopted by the
courts in sexual and racial harassment, are the same results reached in
application? Several commentators see variation in courts' treatment of the
68
differing Title VII claims despite similar statements of the legal standards.
Specifically, some observers suggest that courts today are more willing to
act in the racial harassment context than in the sexual harassment context.
These observations are made either by those advocating stricter attention
by the courts towards achieving a consistent standard through more liberal
judicial enforcement, 69 or those advocating the need for a special standard
(leading to less robust enforcement) to accommodate perceived differences
attendant to particular types of harassment.70
For an example of the perceived differences in application between
the sexual and racial harassment contexts, compare the judicial responses in
Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations1 and Rodgers v.
Western-Southern Life Insurance Co. 72 In Galloway, the plaintiff was
repeatedly referred to as a "sick bitch" by a coworker.7 3 In Rodgers, the
plaintiff's supervisor called the plaintiff "nigger" twice and made
disparaging comments about black employees?74 Despite the roughly
similar fact patterns, in Galloway the Seventh Circuit did not find sufficient
harm for a Title VII claim, while in Rodgers it affirmed a lower court

applicable to both racial and sexual harassment causes of action predicated upon a
pervading hostile climate within the workplace generally .... "); see also Hebert, supra note
16, at 827-29 (suggesting that the Davis court sought to avoid unfavorable requirements
from another Sixth Circuit sexual harassment case by setting a separate standard for racial
harassment).
67. In Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, Justice Souter left open the possibility that the
standards are not "entirely interchangeable." 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 n.1 (1998).
68. See e.g., Kimberly McCreight, Comment, Callfor Consistency: Title VII and SameSex Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 269, 291 (1998)
("[T]he inconsistent treatment of sexual harassment claims cannot be reconciled with the
treatment of racial and religious harassment cases from which the cause of action for sexual
harassment originally evolved.").
69. See Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me a "Bitch" Just Don't Use the "N-Word":
Some Thoughts on Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations and Rodgers v.
Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., 46 DEPAuL L. REv. 741 (1997) (highlighting the
different application of Title VII in racial and sexual contexts).
70. For a discussion advocating a less robust enforcement in the context of religious
harassment out of respect for the inherent constitutional issues involved with attempting to
control an employee's religious views, see Dworkin & Peirce, supra note 27, at 89-91.
71. 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996).
72. 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993).
73. See 78 F.3d at 1165.
74. See 12F.3dat671.
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judgment for the plaintiff, noting that "[p]erhaps no single act can more
quickly 'alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment,' than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as
'nigger' .... ,75
While Rodgers involved the actions of a supervisor 76 it is still striking
to note the basic similarities of the fact patterns and the varying analyses of
the two panels. The Galloway court differentiated between various
77
invectives for females and inquired into the context of the sexual slurs.
Conversely, the Rodgers opinion cited with approval Bailey v. Binyon,78 in
which the court stated that "[t]he use of the word 'nigger' automatically
separates the person addressed from every non-black person; this is
discrimination per se.' 79 In fairness to the Seventh Circuit, not all cases of
racial slurs lead to per se liability. Numerous cases exist-albeit older
cases-in which the use of clear racial or ethnic slurs was not granted per
se Title VII relief.s°
In comparison, within the context of religious harassment under Title
VII, many religious groups argue against imposing the same standard used
for other Title VII protected groups." Advocates for a different standard
draw a distinction between hanging a picture of Jesus in a cubicle and
75. 12 F.3d at 675 (citations omitted) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 67 (1986)).
76. In Burlington Industries, the Supreme Court held that an employer is vicariously
liable when a supervisor creates an actionable hostile work environment. See Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998). It is unclear how a court could weigh
similarly offensive statements from an employer and from a coworker, yet reach varying
results absent any additional facts, given Meritor's holding that employers are not per se
vicariously liable for supervisors' sexual harassment of subordinates. See Meritor Say.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 74 (1986).
77. Chief Judge Posner parsed through varying levels of sexual epithets by reasoning
that "[t]he terms 'fucking broads' and 'fucking cunts' are more gendered than 'bitch'...."
78 F.3d at 1168. The Galloway decision underweighted the question of the impact on the
victim. As the Supreme Court noted in Meritor,"[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment
claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome."' 477 U.S. at 68. Whether
actions are unwelcome is a question analyzed from the victim's point of view. See Ellison
v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-80 (9th Cir. 1991); cf King v. Frazier, 77 F.3d 1361, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) "sexual harassment [must] be
judged from the perspective of the one being harassed"). One must question an appellate
court's ability to assess the impact on a victim from a sterile trial transcript. See Galloway,
78 F.3d at 1168.
78. 583 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Il. 1984).
79. Id. at 927.
80. See, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th
Cir. 1977) (denying Title VII claims where the stadium director referred to ticket-taker as a
"dago" and suggested that all Italian-American employees are members of the Mafia).
These cases reflect a less developed understanding of Title VII and evolving standards of
what a reasonable person would view as harassment. See Bailey, 583 F. Supp. at 931-34.
81. See Dworkin & Peirce, supra note 27, at 44-47 (asking if all harassment should be
treated similarly and judged by the same standard).
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hanging a "girlie" picture in a workstation.82 Those advocating a separate
religious harassment standard draw support from the differences in
treatment by the courts, despite the fact that the courts have not recognized
these differences. 3 These advocates see an inherent conflict between the
suppression of religious harassment and the exercise of free religion, which
further justifies separate treatment. s4 Thus, the question of whether a single
standard for all Title VII claims exists can be answered with a single
response. Both are closely related and frequently litigated areas under Title
VII, but evidence suggests that they are separate contexts that have
developed at different rates.
By glossing over the existence of different contexts, courts borrow
concepts and theories of liability at will. However, each time an innovation
cross-pollinates from one track to the other, there is initial resistance and
caution. In some instances, such as when courts give varying treatment to
racial epithets and sexual slurs as illustrated by comparing Rodgers and
Galloway,
the caution seemingly blurs the courts' abilities to perceive the
85
evidence.
I[. EXTENDING EMPLOYER LIABILITY TO INCLUDE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT BY THIRD PARTIES

Just as Anita Hill's testimony at Justice Thomas's confirmation
hearings gave national publicity to sexual harassment in the workplace, the
1993 sexual harassment suit by former Hooters waitresses, alleging
harassment by customers and managers, helped bring the question of
employer liability for sexually harassing acts of third parties-in this case
customers and crowd members-to the forefront.86 The waitresses' claims,
while controversial, 7 illustrated one of the two types of third-party sexual

82. See id. at 44 (citing examples of the different kinds of harassment covered under
Title VII).
83. See id. at 46-47 (suggesting that harassment standards are not uniform in practice,
despite contrary language from the courts).
84. See id. at 76-77 (advocating separate standards for religion versus other Title VII
categories).
85. Perhaps the courts perceive a benign tinge of awkward sexual relationships, but do
not recognize a similar benign context in the use of racial banter. This benign tinge to the
sexual harassment context may explain, but does little to justify, the disparity in the
Galloway and Rodgers decisions given the close similarity in facts and the mandate of Title
VII analysis. Accord Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing the
different viewpoints of women and men that may lead to misunderstandings).
86. See Andrew Blum, Assumption of Risk Tested in Hooters Suit, NAT'L L.J., May 24,
1993, at 7, 7 ("There is a difference between a place holding itself as a sexual type of
environment vs. going to work in a nunnery.").
87. Compare Kelly Ann Cahill, Special Project, Hooters: Should There be an
Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
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harassment claims.
There are two categories of third-party sexual harassment liability
cases:" (1) when an employer's practices or policies place an employee in
a compromising situation in the path of sexual harassment; and (2) when an
employer incurs vicarious liability under agency principles and fails to
exercise89 reasonable care to avoid and eliminate harassment when it
occurs.

When an employer places an employee in a compromising situation
that bears increased likelihood of harassment, 90 the courts have not been
sympathetic to the employer for resulting harassment. In the first
application of employer liability for third-party acts, EEOC v. Sage Realty
Corp.,9' the EEOC sued an employer who required female lobby attendants
to wear revealing costumes.92 The employer had fired an employee for
refusing to wear a revealing flag uniform that, in two days, generated cat
whistles, propositions, and comments such as, "I'll run it up the flag pole
any time you want to." 93 The district court held the employer liable on the
theory that forcing the employee to wear the uniform was the equivalent of
forcing her to acquiesce to the harassment. 94 The court summarily rejected

Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1107 (1995), with Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for
Success: The Liability of Hooters Restaurantfor Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20
HARv. WOIEN'S L.J. 163 (1997).
88. See Francis Achampong, Third Party Harassment and Other Significant Recent
Developments in Sexual HarassmentLaw: A Discussion of the Latest Developments in
Workplace Sexual HarassmentLitigation,28 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 631, 643 (1994) (setting
forth the two categories of third-party harassment). While the 1998 Supreme Court
decisions focus away from the quid pro quo and hostile work environment classifications,
these decisions remain useful analytical tools.
89. However, consider Rosenbloom v. Senior Resource, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 738, 743 (D.
Minn. 1997), which suggests three categories of sexual harassment case law. See infra note
123 and accompanying text.
90. For example, a Hooters girl and a librarian may have different standards for
acceptable treatment in the workplace. See Rhee, supra note 87, at 193 (discussing this
example).
91. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
92. See id. at 603 n.8 (describing a wide range of different uniforms required by the
employer).
93. Id. at 605 n. 11; see also id.at 604-06 (describing the revealing American flag outfit
expected of the employee and the ensuing comments).
94. See id. at 611. Kelly Ann Cahill writes that the Hooters girls could be seen as
"knowingly and voluntarily assum[ing] the risk of verbal harassment by customers, but [not
assuming] ... the risk of verbal or physical harassment by their supervisors or fellow
employees." Cahill, supra note 87, at 1133. Cahill does not address where third-party
physical harassment falls in her model. Cahill's position is not a uniformly shared point of
view, as Jeannie Sclafani Rhee rejects the availability of this defense to the employer.
While an employee is free to market her sexuality, it remains a constant responsibility of the
employer-even one marketing sex appeal-to combat illegal harassment. See Rhee, supra
note 87, at 199-203.
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any bona fide occupational qualification defenses of the employer,9 5 but did
not go so far as to say that requiring an employee to wear a sexually
provocative outfit automatically leads to a Title VII claim.96
Additionally, an employer's failure to remedy sexual harassment is
seen by the EEOC and courts as sufficient grounds to impute liability to the
employer. The Supreme Court in Faragher and Burlington Industries
underscored this point with the provision of an affirmative defense for
conscientious employers. 97 The EEOC's guidelines similarly consider the
"extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which
the employer may have with respect to the conduct of... nonemployees,"98 which would seem to be part of any reasonableness analysis
of an employer's responses.
For example, immediately in the wake of Sage Realty, the EEOC
concluded in EEOC Decision No. 84-39 that a restaurant owner was liable
under hostile work environment and retaliation theories when a waitress
was sexually harassed by the owner's friends, but the owner failed to act
upon complaints. 1°° The owner did not claim to have taken any remedial or
preventative steps, but acknowledged that he knew of the harassment.'0 '
The EEOC concluded that "[w]hat is significant... is ... [the owner's]
failure to take any action to assure the [waitress] that he did not condone
sexual harassment of his employees and that she would not have to tolerate
such conduct by a customer in the future."' 0 2 Here, in essence, the
employer's inaction was sufficient to create liability. In the terms of
BurlingtonIndustries and Faragher,the owner failed to act reasonably.10 3
The adequacy of an employer's response has been used as a factor in
third-party sexual harassment as well. In Folkerson v. Circus Circus
95. See Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. at 611 (denying any "bona fide occupational
qualification" in requiring employees to wear sexually revealing costumes).
96. Cf. Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 574, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (sustaining the
Title VII claim based on the totality of the circumstances, where the employer required
employee to wear "something low-cut and slinky," but failing to note any third-party acts).
97. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1997).
99. 1984 WL 23399 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 16, 1984).
100. These facts are similar to those confronted by the Tenth Circuit in Lockard v. Pizza
Hut, Inc. There, the Tenth Circuit held a restaurant franchisee liable for its manager's
failure to control the abusive conduct of two customers towards a waitress. See Lockard v.
Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit cited the First, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits as accepting the EEOC's guidelines on third-party harassment. See id. at
1073.
101. See 1984 WL 23399, at *5 ("In this case, the requirement of actual or constructive
knowledge on the part of the Respondent has been satisfied .... ).
102. Id. (emphasis added); see also Crockwell v. Blackmon-Mooring Steamatic, Inc.,
627 F. Supp. 800, 807 n.5 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) ("Conditioning of continued employment on
acceptance of suggestive remarks made by a non-employee can violate Title VII.").
103. See supranotes 38-44 and accompanying text.

1999]

THIRD-PARTY RACIAL HARASSMENT

Enterprises, Inc.,' 04 the Ninth Circuit addressed patron harassment of a

casino employee and held "that an employer may be held liable for sexual
harassment on the part of a private individual, such as [a] casino patron,
where the employer either ratifies or acquiesces in the harassment by not
taking immediate and/or corrective actions when it knew or should have
known of the conduct.' 0 5
In facing the question of third-party sexual harassment, the courts and
the EEOC have repeatedly imputed liability to employers. In the process,
the EEOC and the courts have applied a reasonableness analysis in
measuring employer responses. The reasonableness of a response is
tempered by the constraints of the situation. In the case of third-party
sexual harassment, the employer has fewer coercive tools and frequently
has less information to fashion a response. The same underlying theories
0 6
would seem applicable for the question of third-party racial harassment.
IV. EXPLORING THIRD-PARTY HARASSMENT: DEFINING THE
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR A FAILURE TO ACT

In formulating the standard of liability for third-party harassment, the
courts have expanded the general hostile work environment theory and
borrowed liberally from the standard applied for coworker harassment.
Meritor sets out that "[flor sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment."" 0 7 The
Supreme Court's refinements in Harriselaborate that:
[W]e can say that whether an environment is "hostile" or
"abusive" can be determined only by looking at all the
circumstances.
These may include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance. The effect on the employee's psychological wellbeing is, of course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff
actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological

104. 107 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1997).
105. Id. at 756; see also Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1073-74 (10th Cir.
1998) ("An employer who condones or tolerates the creation of such [a hostile] environment
would be held liable regardless of whether the environment was created by a coemployee or
a nonemployee, since the employer ultimately controls the conditions of the work
environment.").
106. See supra notes 45-85 and accompanying text (describing the relationship between
sex and race under Title VII).
107. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (alteration in original)
(quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).

194

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 2:1

harm... may be taken into account, no single factor is
required.10 8
In the racial harassment context, several courts historically adopted
enumerated prongs for assessing the plaintiff's claim. Under the common
five-prong test the plaintiff must show: (1) that the plaintiff "suffered
intentional discrimination because of race"; (2) that "the discrimination was
pervasive and regular"; (3) that "the discrimination detrimentally affected
the plaintiff'; (4) that "the discrimination would detrimentally affect a
reasonable person"; and 5) "the existence of respondeat superior
liability."' 19
Respondeat superior liability has historically been a source of much
confusion."0 The Supreme Court's clarification of harassment standards in
Burlington Industries and Faragherprovides direction for the evolution of
employer liability.'
The courts, in the creation of a standard to govern third-party sexual
harassment, look to coworker harassment case law for guidance." 2 For
example, in Mart v. Dr Pepper Co.," 3 the district court compared the
standard of employer liability for harassment by third parties to the
standard for coworker harassment. 4 Similarly, a district court in North
Carolina examined a case of mixed alleged sexual harassment by
coworkers and customers in Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp."5 The court
108. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
109. Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir. 1996) (setting
forth the five-prong test).
110. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 81 VA.
L. REv. 273 (1995) (discussing the various applications of respondeat superior as part of a
proposal for an alternative liability schema); see also Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797
F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986) (addressing the confusion of respondeat superior and the
attendant employer duties).
111. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
112. Employer liability for harassment as the result of an employer policy, such as a
uniform requirement, thus far is best likened to a hybrid form of quid pro quo harassment.
At least two courts directly link the imposition of liability for the third-party harassment to
quid pro quo theory. In Wenner v. C.G. Bretting Manufacturing Co., the court writes that
quid pro quo harassment would exist where "the employer made clear to its employee that
submission to the customer's advances was a condition of employment." 917 F. Supp. 640,
646 (W.D. Wis. 1995). The Sage Realty court says that via the uniform requirement, the
"defendants made [the plaintiff's] acquiescence in sexual harassment by the public, and
perhaps by building tenants, a prerequisite of her employment as a lobby attendant." EEOC
v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
113. 923 F. Supp. 1380 (D. Kan. 1996).
114. The Mart court's statement of the law is a bit antiquated given the FaragherBurlington Industries factors for assessing employer vicarious liability. See Mart, 923 F.
Supp. at 1388 ("Under both [the third-party standard and the coworker standard], the
employer is liable, not for the harassment in the first instance, but for negligence in failing
to end the harassment after being made aware of it.").
115. 693 F. Supp. 369 (W.D.N.C. 1988).

1999]

THIRD-PARTY RACIAL HARASSMENT

applied a two-step analysis in which the plaintiff must create a rebuttable
presumption: (1) that sexual harassment took place; and (2) that the
employer "knew or should have known of the harassment, and took no
effectual action to correct the situation."116
The standard for third-party harassment, as seen in the sexual
harassment context and incorporating the new principles of Burlington
Industries and Faragher, therefore represents a logical evolution from
sexual harassment law that can also easily be applied to racial harassment
contexts.
V.

ADOPTING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT THIRD-PARTY FRAMEWORK

FOR THIRD-PARTY RACIAL HARASSMENT

The court's willingness to impute liability to employers for clear
failures to combat sexual harassment should be emulated in the racial
harassment context. The call for a consistent standard by the courts'1 7 is
practical and the need to combat racism in the workplace continues
today."' The Rosenbloom court moved towards this conclusion, but in
doing so, stated unwarranted fears of overextending Title VII." 9
In Rosenbloom, a senior center employee was subjected to continued
racial harassment by both clients and a member of the general public. The
center management was aware of the situation and took steps to end the
harassment by both the clients and the non-client through advertisements,
announcements of center policies, and seeking a restraining order against
the non-client harasser.

20

116. Id. at 380 (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983)) (emphasis
added by Llewellyn).
117. See supra notes 45-85 and accompanying text (examining the relationship between
sexual and racial harassment).
118.Antidiscrimination laws and lawsuits have "educated" would-be violators
such that extreme manifestations of discrimination are thankfully rare. Though
they still happen, the instances in which employers and employees openly use
derogatory epithets to refer to fellow employees appear to be declining.
Regrettably, however, this in no way suggests that discrimination based upon an
individual's race, gender, or age is near an end. Discrimination continues to
pollute the social and economic mainstream of American life, and is often simply
masked in more subtle forms. It has become easier to coat various forms of
discrimination with the appearance of propriety, or to ascribe some other less
odious intention to what is in reality discriminatory behavior. In other words,
while discriminatory conduct persists ....the impermissible impact remains the
same, and the law's prohibition remains unchanged.
Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1081-82 (3d Cir. 1996).
119. See 974 F. Supp. 738, 743 (1997) (quoting David S. Warner, Note, Third-Party
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An Examination of Client Control, 12 HOFSTRA LAB.
L.J. 361, 378 n.102 (1995)).
120. See id. at 740-42.
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The Rosenbloom court feared that the Supreme Court had "implicitly
warned against unsubstantiated judicial extensions of employer liability not
contemplated within the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ",12' These concerns are
muted in light of the Burlington Industries and Faragher standard of
employer liability, even in the absence of knowledge or benefit to the
employer, for the failure to remedy harassing workplace conditions.
Title VII's real goal is the eradication by employers of workplace
harassment, not the imposition of a liability scheme or a tortured
examination of agency principles.
In looking at third-party sexual harassment case law, the Rosenbloom
court identified three categories of precedent: (1) where a third-party
exercises control over the employee and harasses the employee; (2) where
an employer imposes a policy or dress code that makes harassment a
condition of employment; and (3) where "several courts have gone beyond
these two categories of cases and suggest that employers have a broad duty
to protect their employees from sexual harassment, even when an employer
does not directly benefit from the harassment. ' 23
The Rosenbloom court did correctly identify Title VI's imposition of
a general duty of the employer to provide a harassment-free workplace. 24
This, however, does not represent a new theory of liability, but is the
overarching theme of Title VII protections. ' 25 As stated in Garzianov. E.L
DuPont de Nemours & Co., "federal law imposes a specific duty upon
employers to protect the workplace and the workers from sexual
harassment, ' 1 26including redressing known occurrences of sexual
harassment.
Hostile work environment and quid pro quo analysis provide the
framework for the courts to identify the offensive actus reus. For thirdparty sexual harassment, as discussed in Mart and echoed in Burlington
Industries and Faragher,the offensive actus reus is the failure of the
employer to take reasonable corrective action. Stated alternatively, "the
identity and employment status of the harasser is immaterial; the relevant
121. Id. at 743 (quoting David S. Warner, Note, Third-Party Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace: An Examination of Client Control, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 361, 378 n.102
(1995)).
122. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
123. 974 F. Supp. at 743 (emphasis added).
124. A West Virginia state court has even recognized employer liability when a
subordinate creates a hostile work environment for a superior. See Hanlon v. Chambers,
464 S.E.2d 741 (W. Va. 1995).
125. See Zweighaft, supra note 27, at 441-43. "The employer's responsibility to provide
a safe workplace is a positive obligation, distinct from theories of agency." Id. at 442. In
the context of same-sex harassment, Justice Scalia rejected concerns that Title VII was
developing into a "general civility code" for the workplace. See Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).
126. 818 F.2d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 1987).
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issue is whether the employer subjected its employee to a hostile work
environment by allowing the known harassment to continue unabated."1 27
Society does not automatically impute the actual harassing actions of third
parties to the employer, but instead the employer's liability stems from the
failure to act reasonably in providing a harassment-free work environment.
Thus, the employer allows harassment to become a term or condition of
continued employment indirectly. 28 This approach relieves the plaintiff of
having to prove, as suggested by Rosenbloom, some nexus between the
harassing behavior and employer benefits.' 29
As discussed earlier, it is common for sexual and racial harassment
law to borrow freely from each other's innovations. 3"
Given the
intertwining history of the two doctrines, the adoption of third-party
liability for racial harassment cases would not be shocking, but in fact
would be consistent with Title VII's goals and statutory language. Such
adoption would promote a cohesive common framework in the Title VII
harassment context. While it seems inevitable that racial and sexual
harassment law develop at different paces, the courts should not want the
doctrines to diverge significantly. It is ironic that racial harassment law,
the first context in which hostile work environment claims were accepted,
must look to its sexual harassment cousin for guidance on third-party
harassment questions.
Other countries have already applied this responsibility to employers.
In Burton v. De Vere Hotels, a British Employment Appeals Tribunal
confronted the case of two waitresses who were sexually and racially
harassed while they worked at a banquet.'
Both the performer and
audience members barraged the employees with lewd comments and jokes,
while management, who had advance knowledge of the performer's
racially tinged routine, stood by and watched. 132 Reversing a lower court's

127. Otis v. Wyse, No. 93-2349-KHV, 1994 WL 566943, at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1994).
In Otis, an employer attempted to avoid liability by arguing that the harasser was an
independent contractor. See id. The court rejected this contention, citing the broader
principle quoted. See id.
128. Regarding policies and dress codes which represent illegal conditions of
employment, it can be suggested that providing such conditions of employment amounts to
a per se failure by the employer. See supra notes 91-96 (discussing employer liability as a
hybrid form of quid pro quo harassment).
129. See 974 F. Supp. 738, 744 (D. Minn. 1997). Presumably, the Rosenbloom approach
is derived from agency law requirements that traditionally limit liability to acts within the
scope of employment. See generally Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal
Liability for Employment Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509 (1996) (discussing the
evolution of employer liability for the acts of employees).
130. See supra notes 45-85 and accompanying text (exploring the shared history of
sexual and racial harassment doctrines).
131. See 1997 I.C.R. 1 (Employment Appeals Trib. 1996).
132. See id.
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that the failure of the manager to act was
finding, the tribunal ruled 133
sufficient to justify liability.
VI. POLICY RATIONALES IN FAVOR OF ADOPTION

Rachel Zweighaft asks, "What's the harm?" in her comparison of
hostile work environment theory in the United States, Canada, England,
and Australia.13 Critics of the third-party sexual harassment theory argue
that the harm is to the employer: the employer's predicament is severe
VII liability conflict with the economic realities
when the demands of1Title
35
of corporate survival.
When posed with a choice between losing a client or tolerating
racially harassing behavior, many employers believe they cannot, or are not
inclined to, side with their employee for economic reasons. Instead, they
would rather retain the client and terminate the employee. One sexual
harassment victim reported, "When I was dismissed, the agency told me, in
so many words, that it was either me or the account.' ' 3 6 Is the employer, as
one critic of sexual harassment policy described it, an "almost universally
unacknowledged victim?"' 37
At the furthest end of the analytical extreme Professor Achampong
discussed potential employer liability from single isolated third-party acts:
"one egregious act by a non-employee affecting an employee as a direct
result of an employer's job requirement-such as a sexually provocative
'
Professor Achampong
dress code--can... lead to employer liability."138
additionally saw potential for employer liability after single incidents
where the employer failed to act reasonably, citing scenarios such as thirdparty rape and violent sexual assault. 139 It would seem to be a conceptually
possible, but rare, instance for a single event by a third party, without an act
of failure to act by the employer, to run afoul of Title VII's hostile work
environment scheme.
In applying the courts' articulation of Title VII to employers when
133. See id. at 13.
134. See Zweighaft, supra note 27, at 434.
135. See L.A. Winokur, Harassmentof Workers by "Third Parties"Can Lead into Maze
of Legal, Moral Issues, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1992, at B1 (providing examples in which
sexual harassment victims' employers responded by terminating the victims).
136. Id.
137. Paul, supra note 27, at 356.
138. Francis Achampong, Employer Liability for Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment Based on a Single Occurrence, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 187, 205 (1995). Of
course, harassment following an employer-imposed uniform requirement possibly is viewed
differently. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
139. Professor Achampong cited a Michigan Supreme Court case applying Michigan
law, Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 168 (Mich. 1993), for this proposition and
accompanying scenarios.
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there is third-party racial harassment, it is vital to remember that courts find
liability in the implicit sanction of the harassment when the employer fails
to take reasonable corrective and preventive steps. This standard reflects
the result of the courts' balancing of Title VII goals and concerns about
imposing unreasonable burdens on employers.
The Fourth Circuit, in Spicer v. Virginia Department of Corrections,
commented in a sexual harassment context:
The work place is a complex and diversified community in which
employees work closely and continuously in each other's
presence over long hours, during which, experience has shown,
While
inappropriate conduct occurs from time to time.
employers can and should be required to adopt reasonable
policies.., and to take reasonable measures to enforce these
policies, they cannot be held.., liable for any and all
inappropriate conduct of their employees. When presented with
the existence of illegal conduct, employers can be required to
respond promptly and effectively, but when an employer's
remedial response results in the cessation of the complained of
conduct, liability must cease as well. Employers cannot be
saddled with the insurmountable tasks of conforming all
employee conduct at all times to the dictates of Title VII,
irrespective of their knowledge of such conduct or the remedial
measures taken in response to such conduct.' 4°
In offering an employer a choice between repudiating harassing
behavior by clients, customers, and other non-employees by taking proper
remedial steps or repudiating their employees, society presents the
employer with choices no more difficult than the choices expected of other
corporate citizens. If the employer chooses to avail himself of the market,
in this case, the labor market, he also imposes on himself certain societal
expectations and responsibilities. One of these is to assist in the
Title VII's express goal is the
furtherance of public policies. As discussed,
141
elimination of workplace harassment.
To accept anything less, even based on misplaced sympathies for the
employer, would perpetuate illegal and hostile work environments. Due to
42
the employer's position, the employer is best able to end the harassment.
Of course, under Title VII's rejection of employer strict liability for non-

140. 66 F.3d 705, 711 (4th Cir. 1995) (en bane). It would seem that the Burlington
Industries and Faragheranalyses respond to the Fourth Circuit's concerns. See supra notes
38-44 and accompanying text.
141. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,26 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
142. Other actors may be empowered to act against harassment. See supra note 9
(suggesting that elements of criminal law may be used to combat harassment, implicating
law enforcement agencies).
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supervisor harassment,'4 the extent of employer liability is tempered (as
suggested by the EEOC guidelines) so that there will be no liability where
an employer reasonably responds to the extent of its ability.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EMPLOYER

Assuming, arguendo, that liability for third-party racial harassment is
accepted and we can look to the body of third-party sexual harassment case
law, what are the implications for the employer-especially the
conscientious employer? What is the employer's obligation to discover a
racially hostile work environment and to take curative steps?
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has placed a new emphasis on
the responsible employer's reasonable effort to prevent and stop harassing
behavior. In the words of the Court, reasonable steps amount to an
affirmative defense for the employer. 44 A great deal turns for the
employers on the reasonableness of their actions.
EEOC guidelines suggest that assessments of liability will take into
account the "extent of the employer's control and any other legal
responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the conduct of
such non-employees."' 145 While the expectations regarding the employer's
obligations may vary according to the situation, 146 as well as to the
employer's opportunities to end the offensive behavior,' 47 this language
provides less comfort than it would seem in practice. In several instances,
courts have declined to provide a robust reading to that exception and
instead have found liability.
In Costilla v. State,14 the Minnesota Court of Appeals looked to the
EEOC guidelines in interpreting the Minnesota Human Rights Act to find
liability in the state's failure to protect a state labor inspector from

143. See Spicer,66 F.3d at 711 (essentially rejecting a strict liability standard).
144. See supranotes 38-44 and accompanying text.
145. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1997) (sexual harassment context). The EEOC guidelines
for national origin discrimination use the same language. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(e) (1997).
146. See Mart v. Dr Pepper Co., 923 F. Supp. 1380, 1388 (D. Kan. 1996) ("What is
reasonable in terms of remedial action depends on the gravity of the alleged harassment.").
147. Compare Phoebe Weaver Williams, Performingin a Racially Hostile Environment,
6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 287 (1996) (applying the Title VII hostile work environment theory to
the question of racial harassment of black professional athletes by spectators), with
Menchaca v. Rose Records, Inc., No. 94 C 1376, 1995 WL 151847, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 3,
1995) (addressing a case of clear employer notification of third-party harassment and
resultant failure to address the harassment), andPeter Jan Honigsberg et al., When the Client
Harasses the Attorney-Recognizing Third-Party Sexual Harassment in the Legal
Profession, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 715 (1994) (discussing third-party sexual harassment in the
professional employment environment).
148. 571 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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harassment.1 49 Costilla, the plaintiff, complained that she was harassed by
her federal government partner over a three year period. While the state
complained repeatedly to the U.S. Department of Labor about the sexually
harassing behavior of the federal employee and eventually succeeded in
getting the federal employee transferred, the state continued to require the
plaintiff to attend training sessions and conduct a professional relationship
with her harasser. 150 The court concluded that "when the employer initially
delays five months before acting, and ultimately fails to protect its
employee from known sexual harassment by a known sexual harasser for a
period of two years," the employer will be liable.15* In his dissent, Judge
Willis objected that the state could not be expected to do more than what it
had done-complain directly to the harasser's employer.15 2 "Acosta [the
harasser] was an employee of the federal government, not of the state. The
state could not discipline Acosta, nor could it terminate his
employment.1 53
It could be suggested that the Costilla decision is different because the
state knew the harasser's identity and was therefore better able to respond.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Folkerson dealt with crowd harassment of a
female mime dressed as a life-sized doll. 154 The Folkerson court concluded
that the management took sufficient steps to avoid liability by alerting the
casino security of the potential harassment, modifying the plaintiff's
costume to include55 a "Stop, Do Not Touch" sign, and assigning a male
partner performer.1
In the racial harassment context, in keeping with the sexual
harassment case law, an employer must exercise reasonable vigilance to
detect and prevent a hostile work environment. Simply pleading ignorance
in the face of an obvious case of racial harassment would lead a court to
conclude that the 56employer failed to take reasonable steps to deter
harassing behavior.
149. See id.
This court holds that the EEOC [Title VII] guidelines, other jurisdictions'
persuasive decisions, and the broad, liberally construed remedial provisions of
the [Minnesota Human Rights Act] may impose liability upon an employer
when it is aware that its employee is subject to sexual harassment by a nonemployee, yet fails to take timely and appropriate action to protect its employee.
Id. at 592.

150. See id. at 589.
151. Id. at597.
152. See id. at 597-98 (Willis, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 597 (Willis, J., dissenting).
154. See Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 755 (9th Cir. 1997)
(patrons try to see if the mime is a real human by touching her; in the instant case, the patron
moved toward the mime as if to hug her).
155. See id. at 755-56.
156. See Sparks v. Regional Med. Ctr. Bd., 792 F. Supp. 735, 744 (N.D. Ala. 1992)
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Applying the logic of Otis v. Wyse, Burlington Industries, and
Faragher,the non-supervisor's status as a harasser does not necessarily
enhance the ability of a person to create a hostile work environment, 15 7 but
the harasser's status is important if we give any weight to the EEOC
Guideline's second sentence."
A supervisor has more potent tools
available for the creation of a hostile work environment, and thus is treated
differently. But coworkers and third parties are all equally capable of
creating a hostile work environment from which employer liability may
arise.
VIII. OBLIGATIONS OF THE CONSCIENTIOUS EMPLOYER

If employers' current awareness of their liability for third-party
sexually hostile work environments is sparse at best, 5 9 then their awareness
of liability from third-party racial harassment is likely to be even less wellknown. Still, as Professor Achampong warned, courts are not likely to look
far to find liability in cases of egregious harassment. 160 Given the already
161
established low judicial tolerance of racially harassing behavior,
employers who do not proactively seek to limit their liability may be
exposing themselves to tremendous liability. Looking to commentaries and
cases for sexually hostile work environments, one can get a sense of likely

("Lack of actual knowledge may not insulate an employer; knowledge may be imputed if
the harassment is so severe and pervasive that a reasonable employer would be inspired to
investigate and discover the facts."). It would seem that, in the wake of Burlington
Industries and Faragher, a court would analyze the reasonableness of the employer's
ignorance. Surely one must question the reasonableness of preventative acts and policies in
light of blatant harassment fact patterns.
157. See Otis v. Wyse, No. 93-2349-KHV, 1994 WL 566943, at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 24,
1994) (addressing the question of a medical center's liability for the harassment of a nursing
student by an independently contracted doctor and stating that "[t]his standard [for nonemployee sexual harassment] is identical to one test presently employed by the Tenth
Circuit to determine whether an employer can be held liable for harassment perpetrated by
its employees."); cf Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982).
The environment... can be rendered offensive in an equal degree by the acts of
supervisors, coworkers, or even strangers to the workplace. The capacity of any
person to create a hostile or offensive environment is not necessarily enhanced
or diminished by any degree of authority which the employer confers upon that
individual.
Id. (citations omitted).
158. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Lini S. Kadaba, Third-Party Sexual Harassment More Common Than
Most Employers Realize, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TiMES, Dec. 28, 1995, at 4C (describing the
lack of employer awareness of their potential liability for third-party harassment).
160. See Achampong, supra note 138, at 204-08.
161. See supranotes 69-80 and accompanying text.
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judicial expectations of employers.' 62 Courts will: (1) look to see if
employers have reasonably acted to prevent racial harassment, including
the adoption of policies; (2) observe how the procedures for the policy
(3) assess the efficacy of the employer's
were followed upon notice; and
163

efforts to remedy the situation.
The existence of an effective sexual harassment policy helps an64
employer avoid liability when such a policy is reasonably implemented.'
Presumably the same would be true in the racial harassment context. Welldesigned policies encourage employees to come forward with complaints
and voluntarily provide notice to the employer. 65 A court in such a
the non-interest or a failure to adhere to written
situation would likely view
166
policies as unreasonable.
Once notified of the harassment, an employer must investigate the
claim thoroughly and aggressively.' 67 Actions taken must be "prompt and
reasonably calculated to end the harassment. '1 68 Courts have demonstrated
162. A good starting point assessment of individual circuits and their standards may be
found in an American Law Institute-American Bar Association publication, subject to
updates. For a broad framework, see Nancy L. Abell et al., Circuit by Circuit Review of
Selected Sexual HarassmentIssues, CAOl A.L.I.-A.B.A. 609 (1995).
163. See Alan M. Koral, CriticalDecisions in the Investigation of a Sexual Harassment
Claim-PracticePointers and Case Law Update, 543 P.L.I./LIG. 169 (1996), for an
example of suggested responses in the sexual harassment context.
164. See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
165. See Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
[Wlhen... an employer has taken energetic measures to discourage sexual
harassment in the workplace and has established, advertised, and enforced
effective procedures to deal with it when it does occur, it must be absolved of
Title VII liability under a hostile work environment theory of sexual
harassment.
Id. However, the courts have not ruled that the lack of a policy is sufficient grounds to
prove misconduct by the employer; rather, the question is whether there is a reasonable
avenue of complaint. See Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1180 (2d Cir.
1996) ("[T]here is no basis for a per se rule that the absence of a written sexual harassment
policy, standing alone, permits a finding that the employer has failed to 'provide [al
reasonable avenue for complaint."') (quoting Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr.,
Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1992)) (alteration in original). But, under Faragherand
Burlington Industries, the absence of any policy will weigh heavily in a reasonableness
inquiry. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 274 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
(reasoning that defendant's "hear no evil, see no evil" policy, which attempts to avoid
dealing with the racial harassment of employees, fails to meet Title VII expectations),
overruled on other grounds, Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp., 644 F. Supp. 983, 986
(N.D. Ind. 1986) (citing a change in Indiana state law on the question of retaliatory
discharge).
167. For general guidance on investigations, consult a practitioner-focused publication
such as Koral, supra note 163.
168. Hanlon v. Chambers, 464 S.E.2d 741, 751 (W.Va. 1995) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Otis v. Wyse, No. 93-2349-KHV, 1994 WL 566943, at
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that they will look to the circumstances to determine the adequacy of an
employer's response. For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals recently reasoned in the sexual harassment context that
[flor example, if a supervisor complains to her employer of a
subordinate's harassment and employer responds, "You take care
of it," that may in some cases be sufficient-if the supervisor has
full disciplinary authority and circumstances permit use of it. In
other cases, however, that response may be inadequate. The
harassed supervisor could be the object of an entire crew of male
harassers and would likely need greater assistance from her
employer than a flippant, "You handle it." Similarly, the power
to discipline a six-foot, five-inch, 300-pound ex-felon with a
history of violence may not be terribly comforting to a lot of
women supervisors. The point is that common sense must be
appliedto the facts in each case ....169

Similarly, if "employees donned white suits and hats and pranced
around plaintiffs work station, giving the appearance of the Ku Klux
Klan, 1 7 ° courts would more likely expect greater remedial acts by the
employer.
Of course, such a fact and circumstance-intensive inquiry places a
variable expectation on the employer's remedial acts,17 1 that may range
from counseling and warning, to the dismissal of the offender 172 or, in the
*6 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1994) (discussing standards of employer liability for sexual
harassment by non-employees).
169. Hanlon,464 S.E.2d at 750-51 (emphasis added).
170. Abell et al., supra note 162, at 625 (describing the facts from Harris v. International
Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991)).
171. "What is reasonable in terms of remedial action depends on the gravity of the
alleged harassment." Mart v. Dr Pepper Co., 923 F. Supp. 1380, 1388 (D. Kan. 1996); see
also Welsch v. Camelot Soc'y, Inc., No. 37139-8-I, 1997 WL 79479, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App.
Feb. 24, 1997) (holding that in the case of a harasser who was a resident of employer's
facility but could not be fired or disciplined, the employer had no control and therefore had
no liability). The courts do not appear too concerned about the physical location of
harassment as a deciding factor for liability; employers have a duty whether the third-party
harassment is in their facility or in someone else's facility. See, e.g., Kudatzky v. Galbreath
Co., No. 96 Civ. 2693(HB), 1997 WL 598586, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1997) ("[I]t would
defeat the purpose of Title VII to absolve the defendant of liability ... simply because its
employee's work cite [sic] is different than the [defendant employer's primary
workplace]."); EEOC v. Federal Express Corp., No. C94-790C, 1995 WL 569446, at *3
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 8, 1995) (dismissing the fact that customers harassed a Federal Express
employee in the customer's building as a dispositive factor).
172. See, e.g., Spicer v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 66 F.3d 705, 711 (4th Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (reversing panel decision, court finds that Virginia's investigation,
admonishments, and mandatory counseling were sufficient steps taken by the employer).
Accord Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass'n, 41 F.3d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing trial court
summary judgment for defendant where the employee was fired after complaining about the
contractor's sexual harassment); Menchaca v. Rose Records, Inc., No. 94 C 1376, 1995 WL
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third-party context, the banishment of the client. 17 The banishment of a
client is not the only response, or even the best response to third-party
harassment. The Costilla case illustrated an example of this; the Minnesota
agency/employer could hardly "fire" the Department of Labor. Instead,
approaching the increasingly higher levels of the U.S. Department of Labor
may have been an adequate response.174 An employer should think
of options and tools at its disposal to combat
creatively about the range
5
third-party harassment.1
While the employer's choice of response may be reasonably
calculated, must it be effective as well? The courts appear unwilling to
determine whether or not an employer escapes liability based on the third
party's decision to desist-so long as the employer's steps are "reasonably
calculated" to end the harassment. 176 The court in Llewellyn cited an earlier
Fourth Circuit framework where "the plaintiff must show that the
employer.., took no effectual action to correct the situation. This
to
showing can also be rebutted by the employer directly, or by pointing 177
prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment."
This framework flies in the face of an expectation that an employer
151847, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 1995) (holding that a manager's failure to act, after
receiving clerk's complaints and witnessing acts of harassment, creates liability); Otis v.
Wyse, No. 93-2349-KHV, 1994 WL 566943, at *7 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1994) (noting that the
adequacy of remedial measures implemented one year later is a question for the jury);
Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1029-30 (D. Nev. 1992) (finding an
inadequate policy where casino card dealers are supposed to notify floorwalkers when there
is a problem, but complaints nonetheless are ignored).
173. See Hallberg v. Eat'n Park, No. 94-1888, 1996 WL 182212, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Feb.
28, 1996) (holding that warning patron that repeated sexual harassment would result in his
being denied service was sufficient to relieve employer of liability); FederalExpress, 1995
WL 569446, at *3 ("FedEx's argument that it could not remove the customer is
disingenuous. FedEx's own policies condemning sexual harassment... extend to clients
and customers. FedEx might... have chosen to decline to serve [the harasser], the
functional equivalent of removing the harassing customer from the shop or casino.").
174. See Costilla v. State, 571 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). However, in the
specific facts of Costilla,the state agency took five months to act, which might represent an
unreasonable response under Faragherand BurlingtonIndustries.
175. Options include: judicial restraining orders, pursuing criminal complaints, and
approaching the harasser's superiors. Professor Lerner suggested an additional scenario
wherein an employee/customer's representative is harassed by a supplier's representative.
In that scenario, the economic threat of the employer to cease business with the supplier if
the harassment continues might be a reasonable (and effective) employer response. See
Interview with Alan M. Lerner, Associate Practice Professor of Law, University of
Pennsylvania Law School, in Phila., Pa. (Sept. 25, 1998).
176. See Hallberg, 1996 WL 182212, at * 11 ("Since Hallberg did not return to work, it is
unclear whether Eat'n Park's remedial action was actually effective. Nevertheless, a
remedy need only be 'reasonably calculated to stop the harassment' in order to relieve an
employer from liability.").
177. Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369, 380 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (quoting Katz
v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983)) (emphasis omitted).
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harassment, and is not uniformly embraced by courts. 179 The

Burlington Industries and Faraghercases do not suggest whether a gray
area exists between a reasonable employer's response and eradication of
Thus, potential situations exist in which
the harassing behavior.
harassment continues and employers are without liability because they
acted reasonably. 80
However, imposing any tougher standard would simply have the
effect of a weak strict liability standard on employers-if your employees
are harassed and you do not act, you are liable; if you do act reasonably and
if the harassment nevertheless continues, you are liable. Given the unique
lack of control presented by the harasser's third-party status, the
disincentive posed for managers to take reasonable steps that may not be
effective is an undesirable result that militates against moving towards a
Instead, public policy should
stricter standard of employer liability.
encourage all parties to take reasonable steps designed to end harassment in

the workplace.
In sexual and racial harassment case law, the experiences of the courts
unfortunately include instances where tools of redress have been used as
retaliatory measures by employers against harassment victims. For
example, in EEOC v. FederalExpress Corp.,""' a Federal Express courier
was sexually harassed repeatedly by a customer on her route. After the
customer failed to change his behavior, even after a Federal Express
request, Federal Express managers responded by removing the courier from
the route and notifying the harassing customer that they would still deliver
his packages because they "value[d] [his] business.' 82 The court wrote,
"FedEx's response to [the courier's] continuing concerns was to strip her of
an entire building on her route, thereby diminishing her pay. The [EEOC]
guidelines require the employer to take 'appropriate' corrective action, not
action that, in effect, punishes the victim for complaining."'8 3
178. See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The
prevailing trend of the case law... hold[s] that employers are liable for failing to
remedy ....) (emphasis added).
179. See Mart v. Dr Pepper Co., 923 F. Supp. 1380, 1388 (D. Kan. 1996) ("Dr Pepper is
not liable because.. . Dr Pepper took prompt, adequate and effective action to remedy the
situation.") (emphasis added); Costilla v. State, 571 N.W.2d 587, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding liability "when the employer... ultimately fails to protect its employee from
known sexual harassment ....) (emphasis added).
180. The Third Circuit has recognized this precise scenario in the sexual harassment
context. See Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407,411 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997).
181. No. C94-790C, 1995 WL 569446 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 8, 1995).
182. Id. at*1.
183. Id. at *3; see also Kadaba, supra note 159, at 4C ('The [employee] account
manager told her supervisor about the [harassing] client.., and [the supervisor] supported
[the employee] by reassigning the account. But [the employee] wonders if that's the best
way to handle such a situation. Why should she lose a good account for no fault of her
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Consequently, even the most conscientious employer must exercise great
caution in implementing any measure that may be perceived as retaliatory
rather than remedial.
IX. ROSENBLOOM V. SENIOR RESOURCE, INC.

As discussed in the Introduction and Part IV of this Comment,
Rosenbloom is a case of racial harassment at a senior center in
There, an employee complained of repeated racial
Minnesota. 8I 4
harassment from one third-party, Kolb, who "hung around" the senior
center, as well as by the clients of the center. Kolb threatened the
employee, assaulted the employee, and made racial remarks on a number of
occasions at the center."' Senior Resource, the defendant, distributed
antiracism posters, distributed notices that racial harassment was not
accepted, and obtained a restraining order against Kolb. 116 Judge Alsop
concluded:
the record shows Senior Resource was concerned about both
incidents and.., took rapid measures to remedy the situation.
Although it is disappointing that Senior Resource did not respond
more rapidly to the racist slurs by its clients, there are no facts
suggesting that187 Senior Resource ratified or condoned the
comments ....
Judge Alsop's application of sexual harassment theory to the racial
harassment context reflected history. His conclusion that Senior Resource
had fulfilled its duty to deter racial harassment in the workplace gave force
to the EEOC guidelines.
X.

CONCLUSION

Just as we expect employers to provide safe working environments as
a minimal matter, Title VII directs employers to provide a harassment-free
workplace. The courts and society are engaged in an asymptotic pursuit of
the harassment-free workplace-an aspirational goal. In this pursuit,
society uses the law to allocate burdens reasonably among the parties. This
Comment suggests that the resulting hostile work environment scheme is
own?").
184. See supra notes 4-7, 117-23 and accompanying text.
185. See Rosenbloom v. Senior Resource, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 738, 740-41 (D. Minn.
1997).
186. See id. at 740-42.
187. See id. at 744 (footnote omitted). Judge Alsop additionally cited the lack of
employer benefit from the harassment as an additional factor. See id. This factor appears
less important in the wake of Burlington Industries and Faragher,which adjust the
framework of employer liability. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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an evolving scheme, built on parallel tracks for each Title VII context. Just
as the wheels for a train run parallel, so should the wheels underpinning
this Title VII scheme.
The decision to find employer liability for third-party harassment
made sense in the sexual harassment context and would make equal sense
in the racial harassment context.' 88 As discussed, the adoption of a sexual
harassment concept to the racial harassment context is neither surprising,
nor novel in the history of Title VII.
The employer's decision to adopt a policy that invites third-party
harassment of employees represents a practice that we should not condone.
Imposing direct liability on the employer for the results of its own policies
and practices should deter the adoption of such policies in the first place.
When an employer instead encounters the harassment of an employee
by a third party but fails to act, that failure to act is as much a decision
deserving of deterrence as the harasser's decision to target the employees in
the first place. As the party with the greatest opportunity to correct the
prohibited behavior, the employer has the overarching obligation to provide
a harassment-free workplace. The harasser's third-party status should not
allow the evasion of employer liability, although it may temper our
expectations about the employer's efforts.
The presence of racial harassment in the workplace is an ongoing
Where coworkers may be deterred by
problem of great severity.
admonishments of their employer, third parties may not be similarly
affected. The courts must give weight to the EEOC guidelines, which
recognize the employer's limited ability to cure entirely all scenarios of
9
fashion,racism.
the law is able to make
In this balanced
third-party
of workplace
its headwayharassment.
against the 1undercurrent

188. The suggestion discussed previously for a separate religious harassment standard
has problems similar to the separate racial and sexual harassment standards. The failure of
the statutory language to indicate separate standards, the interpretation of the Supreme Court
to date, and the lack of further clarification from Congress together suggest that the same
harassment regime be applied to all Title VII contexts-including race, sex, and religion.
See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing some commentary in favor of
separate religious harassment standards). But see supra note 2 and accompanying text
(discussing First Amendment concerns about Title VI).
189. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(e) (1997) (defining employer duties regarding third-party
harassers).

